In the name of a pipe dream called
"multi-ethnic Kosovo "
By ERIO
The international community is licking its wounds. The recent, renewed escalation of violence in the UN-controlled province of Kosovo during which 19 people have been killed, 954 injured, and many more have lost their property and homes, has been unanimously regarded as a huge setback to the international community’s efforts to establish a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo. While the discussion as to whether the current policy of “standards before status” has failed has now been reopened, no-one has yet dared to question the viability of a concept which was invented by Western policy-makers attempting to legitimise their one-sided participation and subsequent military intervention in a conflict which was stirred up by nationalist forces on both sides. For the sake of this higher ambition the lives of more than two hundred thousand Kosovar refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from minority groups are maintained in limbo.
In an update to its “Position on the need for international protection of people belonging to ethnic minorities from Kosovo” the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) categorised the recent pogroms as “the worst inter-ethnic clashes since 1999”.[1] In line with the statements of high-ranking officials that the recent violence was not merely a spontaneous outburst of hate, but was manipulated by extremist forces, the UNHCR highlighted “the highly volatile situation and the potential for further escalation.”[2]
In the same document, the UN refugee agency reiterated its position on minority returns, i.e. “that persons belonging to minority groups should not be forcibly returned to the province.” Moreover, it called upon the governments of countries hosting refugees from Kosovo to allow people who have already agreed to “voluntary” returns to revoke their decisions. Despite the fact that the UN document did not include any predictions with regard to likely future developmentsof the situation in the province, it left no doubt that any returns to Kosovo will continue to be risky endeavours for the foreseeable future. The Ombudsman of the Institutions in Kosovo, Marek Nowicki, was even more outspoken: in a letter to the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, he wrote that “…at this point in time, it is impossible to say how long the situation in Kosovo will keep them [Kosovar IDPs in Montenegro] from returning to their homes, if ever.”[3]
The exodus of Kosovo’s minorities began exactly five years ago. Some 230,000 people left Kosovo immediately after the end of the US-led military campaign in June 1999, and thousands more joined them in the following months and years. According to Serbian government sources, the Serb population of Kosovo has been reduced by more than two thirds. As regards the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian minorities of Kosovo, the Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker (“Society for Threatened Peoples”) has estimated that 80 per cent of these groups’ members have been expelled from Kosovo, while 75 of their settlements and 15,000 of their houses were destroyed.[4] In January 2004, the UNHCR estimated the number of IDPs in Serbia and Montenegro to be some 225,000 people. It is thought that this figure may turn out to be much higher, since a number of people, in particular Roma, did not register.[5] In Kosovo itself there are 22,000 displaced people remaining because they are unable to return to their region of origin.[6] To our best knowledge, there are no official statistics of the number of Kosovar refugees in the neighbouring countries and in the rest of Europe.[7]
At the time of the crisis in 1999, the international community opted for regional containment of the refugee crisis. European Union countries were the logical principal destinations for people who were forced to leave Kosovo; however, these states sought to avoid a repetition of the scenario which occurred during the war in Bosnia, when the hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees who made their way to Western European countries ultimately remained to settle in their societies. Subsequently, Western governments have made it clear to those who flee conflict and manage to reach safe haven in Western Europe that their presence will only be tolerated as long as the conflict lasts.
Despite its clear warning that Kosovo was not a safe place of return for people from minority groups, the UNHCR recorded the first attempts of governments of host countries to forcibly return people belonging to minority groups to Kosovo as early as 2000.[8] Germany and Denmark are among those countries that forcibly returned individuals who were Kosovar minorities. As recently as 9 March 2004, the Belgian federal authorities put a Kosovar Rom on an aeroplane destined for Pristina. Upon his arrival, he was immediately returned to Belgium by the United Nation’s Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
Those who remained in the region are for the most part even worse off. Not surprisingly in a situation of continued economic decay and flaring nationalism, refugees and IDPs from Kosovo were seldom welcome in their host countries. Almost five years later, many of them, in particular Roma and Ashkali, remain in refugee camps in Serbia and Montenegro. The conditions in these camps, which often consist of makeshift housing built on wastelands, are appalling and reminiscent of Third World slums. In 2003, 5,900 IDPs living in collective centres in Serbia and Montenegro were still relying on food assistance. Between 65 and 90 per cent of the IDPs in Serbia rely entirely or in part on the black economy for subsistence. They represent one of the most vulnerable groups of the entire population, with 90 per cent living below the poverty line.[9] In many cases they do not enjoy the same rights as the local population, or those with refugee status, including access to health services and social aid.
The Norwegian Refugee Council observes that despite the considerable sums of money invested – nearly 40 million Euros in 2003 alone – returns to Kosovo have remained scarce.[10] In October 2003, the UNHCR reported the return of 808 Roma and 2,078 Ashkali as well as 13 Egyptian families;[11] in January 2004, it said that less than 10,000 people had been able to return to their homes in minority areas of Kosovo.[12] The recent pogroms which displaced a further 4,100 people showed that any hopes for steady returns were premature.[13] While it may be an exaggeration to say that the pogroms targeted returnees in particular, it should be noted that a considerable number of recent returnees have again become victims of violence. Some of the houses which were set on fire in Pec/Pejë, for instance, had just been rebuilt to provide new homes for returnees,[14] while the Ashkali and Serbs who have been forced out of their houses in Vuctrin/Vushtri had returned there only six months earlier.[15]
As a result of the pogroms many people belonging to the Roma and Ashkali communities lost hope that they would ever have normal lives in Kosovo, and have expressed the wish to leave. On 27 March, a group of 258 Ashkali who were chased from their homes in Vucitrn/Vushtri and took refuge at a French KFOR base sent a desperate call to the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, asking for relocation to an EU country. My organisation (ERIO) received messages from Roma from Gnjilane/Gjilan saying that they want to leave Kosovo since they have lost any hope of having safe lives there.
The fact that people belonging to Kosovo’s minorities have lost confidence in the ability of the international interim administration to protect their lives is also documented in the recent UNHCR update from 30 March and in the OSCE report on Human Rights challenges following the March riots. The UNHCR has noted that UNMIK’s and KFOR’s lack of preparedness for the renewed outburst of violence, when they were unable to do anything but evacuate the victims, has further undermined the people’s confidence and trust.[16] The Kosovo civil police has been criticized for its failure to protect the victims of the violence; in some cases police officers reportedly took active part in the pogroms.[17]
Even before the pogroms, international NGOs had criticised that violence against people belonging to minority groups remained largely unpunished.[18] The UNHCR update on the situation of minorities in Kosovo from January 2003 included a number of examples where acts of violence had been reported to the Kosovo police, but no follow-up action was taken. Referring to violence against Kosovo Serbs the report notes that: “Even when KFOR detains a perpetrator, and he/she is handed over to the police, the case will not be filed or followed up.”[19] In its recent update, the UNHCR has reiterated its criticism about the lack of follow-up by the judiciary and police with regard to acts of aggression directed against ethnic minorities, resulting in impunity for the perpetrators.
In a comment on the recent violence, Stephan Müller, a former OSCE official in Kosovo, accused the international community of having failed to develop a comprehensive minority policy from the outset and, when it did develop one, failing to include non-Serbian minorities in it.[20] Like many before him, Müller highlighted the situation of the Kosovo Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians in particular. He explained that these groups are much more vulnerable to violence than the Serbs living north of the river Ibar who have at least some control over their lives, politics and economy. Indeed, the estimated 30,000 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians of Kosovo are spread throughout the territory of the province. The fact that they do not have a government which represents and defends their interests further increases their vulnerability.
In January 2001, the President of the Union of Romani Associations in Serbia, Jovan Damjanovic, affirmed that he had collected evidence of the murder of 150 Roma by militants from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In December 1999, KFOR reported 414 recorded murders, including 150 Kosovo Albanians, 140 Kosovo Serbs and the remainder of unknown ethnicity. Of the 254 people killed in 2000, 19 per cent were neither Serbs nor Albanians;[21] among those were four Ashkali killed in Srbica/Skenderaj in October 2000, on the morning following their return in what the UNHCR called “an execution-style killing”.[22] In 2001, Amnesty International reported the murder of six Roma. Accused of collaboration with the Serb authorities during the time of Milosevic and regarded as “Madjupi” or “Cigani” (“Gypsies”) by Albanians and Serbs alike, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians have been targets of contempt and hatred from both sides. A case in point is the example of a deportee from Western Europe who tried to return to the Roma Mahala (quarter) in the Albanian-dominated south of Mitrovica, and was beaten by Albanians. He then moved to the Serb-controlled northern part of the town where Serbs also beat him.[23]
Serbs were arguably the first and main target of the recent attacks. According to the information provided by official sources, the people who were killed in the pogroms were primarily Serbs and Albanians. However, Roma and Ashkaeli were likewise attacked and forced out of their houses. Following a field visit in Kosovo the European Roma Rights Centre reported that 75 houses of Roma and Ashkaeli had been set on fire.[24] In Vucitrn/Vushtri, 56 of the 67 families of a community that once consisted of 300[25] had to be evacuated by KFOR.[26] In Gnjilane/Gjilan, where just 385 people remained of a once 4,670-strong Roma community, attackers threw stones and bricks at Romani houses in Ivo Lola Ribar street, shouting: “Gypsies, come out! We will kill you!”[27]
The persecution of Serbs, Roma, Ashkali, and others (including Kosovo Albanians who happen not to share the mainstream thinking) does not suit the international community. Over a period of several months between 1998 and 1999, the Western public had been told that the Albanians were the good guys and the Serbs the culprits. The existence of other groups of people in Kosovo was only noticed when they were preparing to flee the territory which had been “liberated” by NATO. The international community has since been struggling to maintain the appearance of a democratic order and to prevent the proliferation of ethnic separatism in the neighbouring regions. To acknowledge that ethnic cleansing is going on, but with the roles reversed and under the helpless scrutiny of an international authority[28] would amount to conceding an embarrassing failure.
This is not, however, the only reason why the international community in general and the European Union in particular ultimately stick to the vision of a multi-ethnic Kosovo: if these states were ever to concede that a multi-ethnic Kosovo is not viable, they would have to take responsibility for and address the refugee crisis. Thus the pipe dream of ethnic harmony is maintained, the bitter irony of which is that Kosovo’s minorities are held hostage to a policy which is pursued in their names, but ultimately not their interests.
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[1] UNHCR: Position on International
protection needs of individuals from Kosovo in light of recent inter-ethnic
confrontations,
[2] UNHCR: Position on International
protection needs of individuals from Kosovo in light of recent inter-ethnic
confrontations,
[3] Letter to
